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ABSTRACT 
The activity of innovative practice relates to seizing opportunities now for patients in desperate 
situations and the ethical dilemmas around it. Sadly, the term innovation has multiple meanings, 
adding confusion and misunderstanding to an already difficult debate. This paper aims to enhance 
the definition of innovative practice in two ways. Fist, we propose to curb ambiguity by replacing 
the term "innovative practice" with the more precise of "new non-validated practice" and by 
distinguishing the specific meaning of innovation at stake. To identify this meaning, we analyse the 
traditional research ethics’ distinction between research, validated practice, and innovation. 
Second, we propose the following unified definition of "new non-validated practice", that is, the 
first or recent use of diagnostic, therapeutic or preventive interventions that introduce a 
significant change (new); with an insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular 
healthcare (non-validated); and with the main aim to benefit patients (practice). To avoid 
objections to our definition, we analyse its three core elements (significant novelty, insufficient 
validation for, and patients' best interests) and we present a 2D classification of medical practice 
that follows from our definition. If sound, our enhanced definition of "new non-validated practice" 
allows comparing exceptional activities in different fields of medicine that previously have been 
considered unconnected (e.g. compassionate use of investigational drugs, humanitarian uses of 
devices, novel off-label uses, etc.).  In turn, it also provides a promising conceptual tool to inform 
empirical research, discuss responsible access to innovative care and evaluate the regulation of 
innovative practice (e.g. right-to-try laws). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The activity of innovative practice and the concept of innovation have gained importance in 
medical ethics guidelines (Rietsma and Moreno 2006; Brierley and Larcher 2009; ACOG 2015; 
ISSCR 2016), ethical literature (Taylor 2010; Sugarman 2012; Wilkinson & Savulescu; Holzer & 
Mastroleo 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Earl 2019) and current discussions of different “right-to-try” 
regulations in various countries (Mastroianni 2006; Miola 2015; Dresser 2016; Fins 2017; 
Savulescu 2017; Joffe and Fernandez Lynch 2018; Rosemann, Bortz, and Vasen 2019). The main 
background concern of this literature is seizing opportunity in medicine to offer new options for 
patients in desperate situations and the dilemmas around it. However, the term innovation has 
multiple meanings, which generates confusion and problems of communication (Baregheh, 
Rowley and Sambrook 2009, Lilford 2018), to an already difficult debate. Therefore, this paper 
aims to enhance the definition of innovative practice in two ways. Fist, we propose to curb the 
problem of the multiple meanings of innovation by replacing the term "innovative practice" with 
the more precise of "new non-validated practice" and by distinguishing the specific meaning of 
innovation at stake. To identify this specific meaning, we analyze the traditional research ethics 
distinction between research, validated practice, and innovation.  Second, we propose the 
following unified definition of “new non-validated practice”, that is, the first or recent use of 
diagnostic, therapeutic or preventive interventions that introduce a significant change (“new”); 
with an insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare (“non-validated”); 
and with the main aim to benefit patients (“practice”).  
One easy way to show that the term innovation has a specific meaning in medicine, is to 
compare it to other widely used definitions of innovation in other fields (see Table 1).  
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Term Field Author Definition 
Innovation Economy Shumpeter 
(1947) 
Innovation is “the doing of new things or the 
doing of things that are already being done 





“Technological innovations comprise new 
products and processes and significant 
technological changes of products and 
processes. An innovation has been 
implemented if it has been introduced on the 






“Innovative therapy is the name we give to 
novel medical interventions, radically 
different from the standard of care, provided 
in order to benefit a patient, rather than to 










“New non-validated practice is the first or 
recent use of diagnostic, therapeutic or 
preventive interventions that introduce a 
significant change (section 3.1.), with an 
insufficient level of evidence of safety or 
efficacy for regular healthcare (section 3.2.) 
and with the main aim to benefit patients 
(section 3.3.)” 
Table 1. Concise comparison of definitions of innovation in medicine and other fields 
In economy, Schumpeter defines innovation broadly as “the doing of new things or the doing of 
things that are already being done in a new way” (Schumpeter 1947, p. 151). A more specific 
definition of technological innovation refers to new products and processes or significant changes 
and their introduction in the market (“product innovation”) (OECD 2002). However, despite the 
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family resemblance, the meaning of innovation in medicine we want to capture refers to an 
activity that has as its main aim the wellbeing of patients. For instance, Taylor states that 
“innovative therapy is the name we give to novel medical interventions, radically different from 
the standard of care, provided to benefit a patient, rather than to acquire new knowledge (Taylor 
2010, p. 286). What will strike some readers is that the term innovation at stake refers to a special 
form of medical practice, rather than to a research activity (National Commission 1979, Taylor 
2010, Sugarman 2012). Neither the economic nor the technological definition considers the main 
aim or intention of the innovative activity. Hence, they cannot capture this specific meaning of 
innovation in medicine. This is important because medical practice and medical research have 
different legal and ethical regulations that include different economic, administrative, and judicial 
consequences (Mastroianni 2006; Taylor 2010). Taylor’s definition of innovative therapy does 
capture the main aim of innovative practice and distinguish it from the main aim of research 
(“acquire new knowledge”). However, the term “innovative therapy” is too narrow because 
innovative practice applies also to diagnostic and preventive measures, not only therapies (Levine 
2008, p. 218). As we will argue, a unified definition such as new non-validated practice, avoids the 
ambiguous term “innovation” and captures both the main aim and appropriate scope of innovative 
practice. Furthermore, if sound, our enhanced definition of new non-validated practice allows 
comparing activities in different fields of medicine that previously have been considered 
unconnected (e.g. compassionate use of investigational drugs, humanitarian uses of devices, novel 
off-label uses, etc.).  In turn, since the definition of innovative practice is logically prior to its 
justification and regulation, it also provides a promising conceptual tool to inform empirical 
research, discuss responsible access to innovative care and evaluate the regulation of innovative 
practice (e.g. right-to-try laws). 
Preprints (www.preprints.org)  |  NOT PEER-REVIEWED  |  Posted: 7 May 2019                   doi:10.20944/preprints201905.0070.v1
 6 - 44 
However, before proceeding, we would like to make two clarifications. First, that new non-
validated practice is a neutral definition of innovative practice. We understand that a definition is 
neutral if it can capture all relevant cases of innovation, whether successful or failed (outcome 
neutrality), responsible or irresponsible (moral neutrality) (see figure 1). Here, we agree with 
Lipworth et al. that neutrality regarding ethical justification and regulation is an essential feature 
of an adequate definition of innovative practice because we want to have room for reasonable 
disagreement and avoid using the definition as a rhetorical wand that can compromise critical 
evaluation (Lipworth et al. 2018, p.101). 
 
Figure 1. Neutrality of the definition of innovative practice 
 
Second, we want to clearly state that a systematic analysis of the ethical justification and 
regulation of innovative practice is outside the scope of this paper. The ethical problem of 
innovative practice can be broken down into three interrelated questions. First, what is innovation 
in medicine? (definition). Second, is innovation ethically permissible? (justification). Third, if 
permissible, what are the ethical principles and appropriate governance of innovation? 
(regulation). In view of our aim, in this paper we will mainly focus on the first question. However, 
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we will sometimes need to present substantive positions to show how our definition works. When 
we do this, we will explicitly present these positions as maintained either by the defenders or 
detractors of innovation and rely on most commonly held ethical principles of responsible 
innovative practice when needed (e.g. WMA 1964 [2013], para. 37, ISSCR 2016).  
To defend our proposal, we will proceed as follows. In section 1, we analyze the definition of 
innovation in traditional research ethics. We revisit the distinction between research, validated 
practice, and innovation in the Belmont Report. Also, we reconstruct Levine’s definition of non-
validated practice. In section 2, we present a selection of exemplary cases to show why innovative 
practice is usually considered a valuable medical activity that is different from both, validated 
practice and research. This preliminary conceptual analysis and the exemplary cases help us to 
develop the conceptual core of our proposal. Readers familiar with this discussion may want to 
skip ahead to section 3. In section 3, we introduce our definition of new non-validated practice and 
critically analyze its components. To avoid confusions with related activities, we also introduce a 
four-category classification of interventions used in medical practice that logically follows from 
our proposal  
1. THE DEFINITION OF INNOVATION IN TRADITIONAL RESEARCH ETHICS 
1.1. The Belmont Report’s Definitions of Validated Practice, Research, and Innovation 
According to Beauchamp and Saghai (2012), the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter the Commission) established 
two classes of activities labeled “research” and “practice” as categories for medical activities that 
are logically distinguishable from each other (although they may coexist in complex activities). 
The practical aim of this distinction in the Belmont Report is to establish what kinds of activities 
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must undergo special regulations and ethical review by institutional review boards. However, the 
distinction is not drawn between research and practice as such, but between research and 
validated practice1.  Hence, the Commission defines validated practice as follows: 
[F]or the most part, the term [validated] “practice” refers to interventions where: (P1) the 
purpose of an intervention is “to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment, or therapy”; (P2) 
the intervention is “designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or 
client” (though benefit to other persons is sometimes the goal); (P3) the intervention has “a 
reasonable expectation of success” (National Commission 1979; as quoted in Beauchamp 
and Saghai, 2012, p. 52, edited).  
In our interpretation of the scope condition (P1), the term “practice” refers to preventive, 
diagnostic, or therapeutic uses of medical interventions, as well as—we will include as a logical 
addition—their combination. However, the necessary conditions that defines practice is the 
design condition (P2), that is, if medical interventions main aim is to enhance the well-being of an 
individual patient. Hereinafter, we will drop the “solely” in the formulation of (P2). This does not 
present a particular problem for traditional research ethics, since the Belmont Report includes 
both, a wide and narrow formulations of the practice condition. Practice in a narrow sense refers 
to paradigmatic cases of the doctor–patient relationship (Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 54). 
However, the Belmont Report also formulates design condition (P2) in a wide sense as “an 
intervention designed to enhance the well-being of a particular individual or groups of 
individuals” (National Commission 1979, note 1). This wide formulation logically captures the 
                                                          
1 . Here, we interpret standard practice in the prescriptive sense that it has a sufficient level of evidence 
of safety and efficacy for regular healthcare use. As we will later discuss, we are aware that the term 
“accepted or standard practice” used in a descriptive sense may not always refer to validated practice 
(London 2006, p. 28-9). 
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narrow paradigmatic sense of practice, as well as non-paradigmatic cases of practice. For example, 
interventions designed only to enhance the well-being of others (e.g., blood donation and organ 
transplant) and interventions designed to enhance the well-being of an individual and others (e.g., 
vaccination) (Levine 1979, p. 22; National Commission 1979, note 1). 
The remaining question is how to interpret the validation condition (P3) of “reasonable 
expectations of success”. Reasonable expectations of success vary in different contexts. Here, we 
want to distinguish between two different contexts, that is, the use of an intervention in regular 
healthcare and the use of an intervention for patients with unmet health needs and no reasonable 
alternatives. We will argue that for validated practice the validation condition (P3) should be 
interpreted as referring to the use of interventions in regular healthcare context. If this is the case, 
all exemplary cases of innovation fail, by definition, to meet the evidence threshold of sufficient 
validated practice at the time they were used.  
The Commission also defines research as follows:  
To qualify as research two conditions are central. The first is not a necessary condition for 
all forms of research, but the second is a necessary condition: (R1) there is (in pertinent 
research methods) a formal protocol-controlled design to test a hypothesis; (R2) there is an 
organized design ‘to develop or contribute to generalizable [scientific] knowledge’. 
(National Commission 1979; as quoted in Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 52).  
The design condition (R2) of “generalizable [scientific] knowledge” defines research in the 
traditional view. The Commission’s specifies “[…] that knowledge gained through research must 
be oriented toward the types of generalizations found in scientific theories, scientific laws, and 
statements of relationships, in contrast to the learning that occurs in particular cases through 
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astute clinical observations or diagnostic tests” (Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 52). They 
recommend that if an activity has an organized design “to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge,” it should undergo a research review to protect human subjects, irrespective of the 
fact that the intervention is also intended to provide a direct health benefit for an individual 
patient (Levine 1979, p. 23). Thus, the Belmont report established a precautionary measure to 
prevent researchers from taking advantage of a loophole in the oversight system by presenting 
research with components of care under the label of “practice” to avoid the review process 
(Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 43). However, this measure does not apply to uses of 
interventions with the main aim to the benefit of an individual patient with insufficient level of 
evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare, if they do not have evident research 
components (e.g. . 
Finally, the Commission introduces a further distinction they call innovation and that cannot be 
regarded as validated practice or research:  
When a clinician departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the 
innovation does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure is 
“experimental” in the sense of new, untested, or different does not automatically place it in 
the category of research. Radically new procedures of this description should, however, be 
made the object of formal research at an early stage in order to determine whether they are 
safe and effective. Thus, it is the responsibility of medical practice committees, for example, 
to insist that a major innovation be incorporated into a formal research project (National 
Commission 1979, emphasis added). 
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In the Belmont Report, innovation is defined mainly in terms of novel interventions that 
significantly depart from validated practice, but retain its main intention to benefit patients. The 
Commission refers less clearly to non-validation (“untested” procedures). Innovation does not 
constitute research even if it entails a relevant change in the benefit-harm profile of an 
intervention in comparison with standard practice. As we will discuss, this implies that the 
practice-research distinction in traditional research ethics is not related to the harm-benefit 
profile or soundness of evidence of a medical activity. Whether an activity is research or practice 
depends on what the activity is “designed” to do, that is, its main aim or intention (and the 
appropriate means used to pursue them). The Commission does neither consider innovation to be 
a “grey zone” between research and practice (King 2002), nor introduce a third category of 
activities for innovation. Instead, as we will argue following Levine, the Commission considers 
innovation as practice because its main aim is to benefit individual patients.  
As a result, commissioners and staff were concerned about underprotection of patients. 
Toulmin and others even hypothesized that certain medical practices, such as innovative 
therapies, were potentially more risky than well-design research (Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 
50; Fins 2017). Hence, the Commission went beyond the definition of innovation in the Belmont 
Report. They supported the view that the oversight of innovation should be improved and advised 
“medical practice committees” (not IRBs or research ethics committees) are responsible that 
innovation should be made the object of formal research at some point. But eventually the 
Commission fell short of proposing regulations for innovation. They made that decision because 
the National Research Act was about research and the politics of institutional forces in medicine 
would not allow any venture into the regulation of practice (Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 45-
50; Fins 2017).  
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1.2. Levine’s Definition of Non-Validated Practice 
To our knowledge, Levine (1979) offers the most thorough analysis regarding the concept of 
innovation based on the Commission’s different reports. According to Levine (1979), the purpose 
of the Commission in introducing the term innovation has been to avoid common confusion with 
research because they share the attribute of significant change from accepted or standard 
practice. However, Levine suggests abandoning the term innovation for a better term and defines 
this subclass of practice as follows: 
Nonvalidated practices [sic.]. A class of procedures performed by physicians conforms to 
the definition of “practice” to the extent that these procedures are [P2] “designed solely to 
enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client.” However, [not P3] they may not 
have been tested sufficiently often or sufficiently well to meet the standard of having “a 
reasonable expectation of success.” The Commission uses various terms to describe these 
procedures: [e.g.] “innovative therapies” […]. In my opinion, the best designation for this 
class of procedures is “nonvalidated practices” [sic.]. Novelty is not the attribute that 
defines this class of practices; rather, it is the lack of suitable validation of the safety or 
efficacy of the practice (Levine 1979, p. 22, edited). 
First, although here the scope condition (P1) is not mentioned it is implied. In later work Levine 
clarifies that “the Commission’s reasoning about how to deal with such practices applies to 
diagnostic and preventive measures, not only therapies” (Levine 2008, p. 218). Hence, “innovative 
therapy” (Taylor 2010) does not capture the full extension of the term innovation in research 
ethics or is confusing. This is the case because if taken literally, it restricts the scope to just one of 
the three possible uses of a medical intervention. Second, Levine disregards novelty as a defining 
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attribute of innovation. In section 3.1, we argue this is a mistake and try to amend it. Third, for 
Levine, what makes practice non-validated is the failure to meet “reasonable expectations of 
success” condition (not P3). In section 3.2, we contend that both the Commission and Levine 
understands “reasonable expectations of success” as referring to the level of evidence an 
intervention should meet to be used as regular healthcare. Finally, Levine considers an 
intervention as practice if it meets the design condition of “enhancing the well-being of 
individuals” (P2). Although Levine quotes the narrow (“solely”) formulation of design condition 
(P2), we will interpret it in the wider sense, as discussed above. Levine’s conceptual analysis sheds 
light on the fact that the Commission considers innovation as a form of practice, not research or 
other sui generis category. In section 3.3, we will further inquire what it means for an intervention 
to be considered practice in the Commission’s sense. But before developing our proposal in full, it 
will be useful first to give some flesh to the concept of innovation to make it more accessible to the 
general reader. 
2. EXEMPLARY CASES OF INNOVATIVE PRACTICE 
Before developing our proposal, we outline three exemplary cases of what we might consider 
innovation, already within the definition of traditional research ethics. Our aim here is to give the 
reader an intuitive grasp of the circumstances where innovation occurs. For reasons of space, we 
have to impose ourselves some restrictions. First, we only provide exemplary cases of therapeutic 
and diagnostic uses, but not preventive interventions.2 Second, we skip classic examples of 
                                                          
2 For instance, preventive uses of interventions for Ebola Virus Disease under the Monitored Emergency Use of 
Unregistered Interventions (MEURI) framework could be regarded as an exemplary case of preventive new non-validated 
practice (WHO 2018). 
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innovation in surgery in favor of cases with drugs, biologicals and devices where the discussion is 
less developed.  
Our first exemplary case of innovation refers to the successful therapeutic use of an 
intervention: 
The Farrows: stem cell transplantation of umbilical cord blood. In 1988, Matthew Farrow, a 
5-year-old patient with Fanconi’s anemia who had no reasonable medical alternatives for 
treatment, received the first successful umbilical cord blood transplant from his baby 
sister, Alison Farrow, based on sound scientific evidence, including animal studies 
(Gluckman et al. 1989; BBC 2001). Since this first successful transplantation, cord blood is 
now widely used as a treatment with hematopoietic stem cells for a wide range of 
malignant and non-malignant conditions (Gluckman et al. 1997; Taylor 2010; Sugarman 
2012).  
Successful cases such as Matthew Farrow intuitively illustrate the potential benefits of 
innovation, which serves as a basis for defending it for patients with unmet health needs, serious 
conditions and no reasonable, validated medical alternatives.  
Nevertheless, the use of new non-validated interventions that aim to benefit individual patients 
does not always attain the desirable results for patients deprived of alternative validated options. 
Therefore, consider the following case of a failed therapeutic use of an intervention: 
Jim Gass: stem cell therapies. The case of Jim Gass caused an outcry in international media 
that illustrated a growing concern about the number of “stem cell tourists” worldwide. He 
had several stem cell interventions at private clinics in Mexico, China, and Argentina, 
paying tens of thousands of dollars each time for injections to recover from a stroke. The 
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total cost, including travel expenses, reached 300,000 US dollars. Eventually, Jim Gass 
developed a tumor in his lower spinal column. The subsequent tests showed that the tumor 
mass was made up of abnormal, primitive cells that were growing aggressively (Kolata 
2016). 
Someone may claim that the case of Jim Gass is not an exemplary case of responsible innovation 
but one of potentially inappropriate or futile use of cell therapy. This is a reasonable claim, and it 
will be discussed in section 3.2. However, this case is useful to remember us that our proposal is 
neutral and captures all cases of innovation, whether successful or failed, responsible or 
irresponsible. 
As implied in the scope condition (P1), examples of using new and unproven interventions 
outside of sound research are not limited to therapeutic and preventive procedures and can also 
be exemplified by diagnostic use of interventions.  
Genome sequencing for rare diseases. Two siblings in the United Kingdom with an unusual 
muscle wasting disease had to wait 20 years until they were diagnosed at a cost of more 
than 14,000 pounds. Whole exome sequencing, costing approximately 1,000 pounds at this 
time, revealed that a heterozygous mutation was likely disease causing (Perdeaux 2013; 
Rehm et al. 2015).  
Although genomic sequencing does not “intervene” in the sense it can change the patient’s 
genome like gene editing, new diagnostic tools are interventions in the sense that have the 
potential to change some patient’s life. Patients who suffer from rare diseases are usually in this 
situation. They often face long and burdensome diagnostic procedures over several decades. 
Despite the uncertainties of our genetic knowledge, rapidly diagnosing a rare disease is crucial to 
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avoid distress, and unnecessary potentially harmful therapeutic interventions. Moreover, in some 
cases molecular diagnosis of rare diseases may lead to improved treatment or preventive 
decisions. In the defenders’ view of responsible innovation, considerations of this kind make the 
benefit-harm profile of new non-validated diagnostic interventions positive for the use in a limited 
number of patients, despite its inherent risks. Therefore, some uses of genome sequencing 
technologies, including whole genome and whole exome sequencing for patients with rare 
diseases, are recent exemplary cases for innovation, precisely when they are not sufficiently 
validated for regular healthcare.  
Finally, innovation can be the result of combining different interventions with different 
purposes: 
The Nashes case: IVF, cord blood transplant, and PGD. Molly Nash was born in 1994 with 
type-C Fanconi’s anemia, a more aggressive type than the one that affected Matthew 
Farrow. Lacking a suitable match for a bone marrow transplant, the Nashes conceived a 
baby they named Adam to be a suitable umbilical cord blood donor that possibly matched 
with Molly. However, due to their low probability of having a baby without Fanconi’s 
anemia, the parents had to use three different interventions—namely, in vitro fertilization 
(IVF), pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and umbilical cord blood 
transplantation—to have an acceptable donor. The PGD was used twice, first to select an 
embryo without Fanconi’s anemia and then to find a match for Molly (Faison 2005).  
As Kahn and Mastroianni (2004) note, the chosen interventions in the Nashes’ case had 
sufficient level of evidence to be used in regular healthcare for their intended indications in 2000 
when Adam was borne, so they were separately considered validated practice. However, the 
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combination of these interventions –necessary to attain a more promising treatment for Molly3– 
was still considered an innovation (“experimental procedure”) at that time and was not covered 
by insurers (Kahn and Mastroianni 2004, p. 92). 
As Taylor notes, exemplary cases of innovation do not follow the linear model of basic research, 
to translation, to clinical research, and eventually to its application. Instead, innovation comes 
from thinking backward from a patient’s perspective and forward from deep knowledge of how 
the body functions and interacts with the disease to challenge the limits of current therapeutic, 
preventive, and diagnostic interventions (Taylor 2010, p. 286). For those who believe innovation 
is ethically justified, novel and yet untested interventions can be an option for patients who lack 
reasonable medical alternatives for their health conditions despite the uncertainty of such 
interventions in terms of risks and potential benefits.  
Having introduced some exemplary cases of innovation, we now introduce our proposal of a 
refined definition of innovation in for research ethics.  
3. INNOVATION AS NEW NON-VALIDATED PRACTICE 
We propose to define innovation as new non-validated practice, that is, the first or recent use of 
interventions with an insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare and 
with the main aim to benefit patients. Levine’s definition of non-validated practice focuses only on 
non-validation (insufficient evidence of safety or efficacy) and leaves out the characteristic of 
novelty. We suggest that it is the conjunction of both novelty and non-validation that defines 
                                                          
3 As Faison states “A bone marrow transplant, in which diseased cells are killed off and replaced with new donor cells, is the 
only cure for progressive bone marrow failure. But the procedure is risky at best. When Molly Nash was born, the success 
rate of a transplant from an unrelated donor was a dismal 18 percent. However, under the right circumstances, the success 
rate for transplants from a brother or sister was as high as 65 percent” (Faison 2005). 
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innovation in traditional research ethics. However, we agree with Levine and the Commission that 
innovation is a subclass of practice and not of research. Hence, we see our definition as a 
continuation and refinement of what we call the traditional research ethics view.  
But before proceeding, we would like to explain the rationale for grounding our proposal on 
this view. Essentially, we think the traditional research ethics analysis of innovation harmonizes 
with most of the current discussion on the literature of justification and regulation of innovation 
and yields a greater practical impact than other alternatives such as innovation as “a grey zone” 
between research and practice (e.g. King 2002). First, the defenders of innovation consider 
responsible innovation in certain circumstances not only ethically permissible medical practice for 
patients, but sometimes also an obligation of doctors (London 2006)4. However, this does not 
mean to uncritically defend the current way of regulating innovative care. For instance, Taylor 
(2010) proposes to improve the current regulatory landscape with an independent oversight 
mechanism, which does not mistake innovation for research. Also, Sugarman, argues that doctors 
have an obligation to incorporate innovation into sound research in a timely manner after 
experience with, at most, a few patients (Sugarman 2012, ISSCR 2016). These authors also defend 
that that innovation cannot be reduced to research, due to its complex nature (Agich 2001, Taylor 
2010). Second, authors that disagree with defenders also use the same meaning of innovation. 
These detractors argue that innovation in medical practice should be prohibited on ethical 
grounds, and usually propose standard research protections as appropriate regulation for all non-
validate interventions (Agich 2001). For instance, they claim that “last chance” unproven 
interventions should only be accessible through research studies designed to evaluate the safety 
                                                          
4 London identifies this as a special category within a wider spectre of innovation and names it “innovation as emergent 
problem-solving” (London 2006, pp. 45-46). 
Preprints (www.preprints.org)  |  NOT PEER-REVIEWED  |  Posted: 7 May 2019                   doi:10.20944/preprints201905.0070.v1
 19 - 44 
or efficacy of new interventions (Emanuel 2013).5 Third, the concept of innovation it is used even 
under learning healthcare systems, in which the sharp distinction between research and practice 
of the current system is allegedly “blurred” (Kass et al. 2013). For instance, Faden et la. (2013) 
explicitly uses a similar definition of innovation or non-validated practice, as do the Commission 
and Levine.6 Similar to Taylor (2010), they propose regulatory measures, such as oversight and 
systematic assessment of innovation and other practice that has not been rigorously evaluated. 
Moreover, they explicitly state that they will not simply expand the current review system for 
research to solve the problem of patients’ underprotection from insufficient validated practice 
(Faden et al. 2013, p. s24). This brief summary of the literature shows that despite the differences 
on matters of justification and regulation, all the authors referred to above share the Commission’s 
and Levine’s concept of innovation. 
Hence, to introduce our proposal of innovation as new non-validated practice, we now analyze 
the three core elements, which are novelty (“new”), insufficient validation for (“non-validated”), 
and intention to benefit individual patients (“practice”). 
 
                                                          
5 “6. Research of Unproven, “Last Ditch” Treatments: In the treatment of a patient, where proven interventions do not exist 
or have been ineffective, the physician, after seeking expert advice, with informed consent from the patient or a legally 
authorized representative, may use an unproven intervention to promote the patient’s health or well-being, but only if it is 
undertaken as a research study designed to evaluate its safety and efficacy. Repeated uses of an unproven intervention can 
only be justified as part of a research study that fulfils all the protections in this Declaration” (Emanuel 2013, emphasis 
added). 
6 “Health care institutions and clinicians are constantly adopting new practices, ranging from platforms to support clinical 
decision-making built on electronic health systems to minimally invasive and robotic surgery. These innovations are often 
introduced without systematic assessment of their impact, perhaps to avoid crossing the unwelcome and curious divide 
between practice and research. Our framework makes this distinction irrelevant to questions of oversight and provides 
reasons why health care institutions and professionals are obligated to accompany the introduction of such innovations—as 
well as practices that have never been rigorously evaluated—with a commitment to systematically learn about their effects 
on clinical outcomes, health care value, patients’ experience, and heath disparities” (Faden et al. 2013, p. s24-5) 
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3.1. Novelty (“New significant change”) 
In Levine’s analysis the defining attribute of innovation has been “[…] the lack of suitable 
validation of the safety or efficacy of the practice” (Levine 1979, p. 22). However, we suggest that 
it is the conjunction of both novelty and non-validation that captures the specific meaning of the 
term innovation in traditional research ethics. Hence, we first need to delineate the concept of 
novelty.  
We stipulate that the attribute we call “novelty,” the term “new” refers to the recent or first use 
of an intervention that introduces a significant change in the context of medical practice. Here, it is 
useful to differentiate “significant change” from “mere variation” or non-significant change 
(London 2006, p. 31; ACOG 2015, p. 5) to avoid including meaningless changes in practice under 
the label of innovation. For example, medical powdered gloves have been extendedly used since 
the 1990s due of concerns with HIV (Palosuo et al. 2011). Replacing blue with indigo gloves would 
probably not be considered a significant change in most cases. However, a change from powdered 
latex globes to nitrile or non-powdered latex gloves could be a significant change, and hence an 
innovation, given that latex allergies are a major concern (Palosuo et al. 2011). More formally, one 
criterion proposed to distinguish between innovation and mere variation is that a change is 
significant if it entails a relevant modification in the benefit-harm profile of the use of an 
intervention, given a specified context (London 2006, p. 31). 
Furthermore, we use the term “long-standing” as the logical opposite to “new” in the sense that 
it does not refer to the recent or first use of an intervention that introduces a significant change. In 
our analysis, we mainly use “new” and “long-standing” as terms that refer to continuous time 
properties of objects (segments of time), not discrete time properties (points of time). We define 
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novelty as the “first or recent uses of an intervention” (segment of time) because something is new 
even if it has been used a few times (points of time). We cannot offer a precise limit to the use of 
the term “new” and say how many uses it implies to become “long-standing”. However, we believe 
this is a positive feature of our definition because it does not settle in advance matters 
corresponding to justification and regulation. Also, in our definition of new non-validated practice, 
we take as the ideal meaning of novelty uses of interventions that have not been used before 
anywhere at any time. In principle, this implies that “new” or “long-standing” are not a country, 
hospital, or department specific concept. For instance, if a long-standing validated intervention is 
used for the first time in Argentina (even though it has been used for 30 years in the US), it may 
not constitute an innovation according to our definition of new non-validated practice. It could be 
rather an implementation of a long-standing validated intervention. Time, country or other 
specific uses of the concept of novelty might be useful for practical purposes, such as for 
regulation or evidence extrapolation from one specific context to another. However, they do not 
replace the ideal meaning of novelty. 
Consequently, once we introduce novelty and non-validation as two necessary attributes of the 
definition of innovation, we obtain a classification of four different categories of “practice”–still in 
the traditional research ethics sense–that is, the use of an intervention with the main aim to 
enhance patients’ well-being (see Table 2). Within this classification, innovation refers to “new 
insufficiently validated interventions.” The rest of the exemplary cases quoted in the table 
illustrate the remaining categories as we understand them. 
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Novelty 
Validation 
New practice Long-standing practice 
Non-validated practice New insufficiently validated 
interventions (innovative 
practice).  
Examples: The Farrows, 
Jim Gass, genomic 
sequencing for rare 





episiotomy for vaginal 
birth in 2009 (Carroli and 
Mignini 2009) 
Validated practice  New sufficiently validated 
interventions.  
Example: imatinib for CML 




Example: amoxicillin for 
infectious diseases in 2018 
(Sutherland et al. 1972) 
Table 2. 2D classification of medical practice characterized by validation and novelty 
 
Our first argument for a refined definition of innovation is that conflating novelty and 
validation is a semantic confusion that can lead to false implications. An example of conflating 
novelty and validation is the following statement by King (2002, p. 574): “[…] how does innovation 
differ from standard medical practice? By virtue of its novelty it lacks reasonable expectation of 
success”. Admittedly, both concepts correlate in many interventions, such as the concepts of 
“swan” and “white” do in many birds, but not in all. Hence, if we conflate the novelty of an 
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intervention with its insufficient evidence, we incorrectly imply that either all new interventions 
used in practice are non-validated or all long-standing interventions are validated. 
Second, even if novelty and non-validation are appropriately distinguished, defining innovation 
only in terms of “non-validation” is still confusing. If Levine’s “non-validated practice” proposal is 
taken as equivalent to the definition of innovation in the Commission’s sense, then cases of long-
standing non-validated interventions, such as routine episiotomy–an incision of the perineum to 
facilitate the baby’s birth–would fall under the category of innovation. However, no one would call 
routine episiotomy an innovation today, although it was introduced as such in the first half of the 
20th century (Carroli and Mignini 2009). Christine Grady puts forward a similar objection to long-
standing “off-label” uses of drugs (Sugarman 2017). 
Third, we argue that our definition and the classification for interventions used in practice it 
implies (Table 2) help to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. On the one hand, it is crucial to 
distinguish innovation (new non-validated practice) from long-standing non-validated practice. 
Typically, the real-world problems of innovation as new-non-validated practice are related to 
whether they should be used in the first place, and if this is the case, when and how they should be 
made object of sound clinical research. However, cases of long-standing non-validated practice, 
like the current use of routine episiotomy are different. The question is rather how to gather 
sufficient scientific evidence to establish a harm-benefit profile of the intervention. Moreover, in 
the case of routine episiotomy, the relevant question is how to stop doctors from using accepted 
long-standing interventions when there is sound evidence that a practice lacks net clinical benefits 
(Carroli and Mignini 2009). These concerns can be extrapolated from routine episiotomy to other 
long-standing non-validated interventions, such as the off-label use of drugs or devices in 
reproductive and maternal health (Little and Wickremsinhe 2017). If this extrapolation is sound, it 
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makes a distinction between new and long-standing non-validated practices even more useful. On 
the other hand, it is also useful to distinguish between new and long-standing validated 
interventions to better understand the specific meaning of innovation in traditional research 
ethics. For instance, the drug imatinib for chronic myeloid leukemia is an exemplary case of new 
validated practice in the early 2000s after rational drug design and sufficient validation from 
expedited multiphase randomized controlled trials (Druker 2009, Chary 2016). Unlike the 
exemplary cases of innovation, imatinib did follow the linear model of basic research to clinical 
research and eventually to practice (Taylor 2010, p. 286). Therefore, it makes sense to talk about 
new validated interventions and distinguish them from exemplary cases of innovation such as the 
Farrows, Jim Gass, genomic sequencing for rare diseases, and the Nashes. In turn, we also argue 
that even though imatinib has been validated and thus shown sufficient evidence for its regular 
use in healthcare for CML in the early 2000s, its harm-benefit profile was not yet fully established 
at that time. For instance, some rare adverse events are only known after long-standing use 
because they occur after thousands (or tens of thousands) of uses. Hence, long-standing validated 
interventions, such as amoxicillin for infectious diseases, usually have the advantage of a better-
known harm-benefit profile than new validated practice. 
Finally, with our classification we do not lose but integrate and clarify the insights of what here 
call the traditional research ethics view. We rescue the Commission’s intuition that it is important 
to highlight the attribute of novelty as the recent or first use of an intervention that introduces a 
significant change because this is why new non-validated practice gets commonly confused with 
research. But we keep Levine’s intuition that non-validation is a central attribute to distinguish in 
practice whether it is new or long-standing.  
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3.2. Insufficient Validation for (“Non-Validated”) 
Although “validation” is an epistemic concept, “insufficient validation for” is an ethical concept. 
Sufficient validation presupposes that an intervention has a sound level of scientific evidence of 
safety or efficacy for a certain use in certain contexts. Insufficient validation lacks this level of 
evidence. The proper task of ethics does not consist in establishing what this level of evidence is, 
but rather in justifying what reasonable agents can or are required to do given different levels of 
evidence, uses, and circumstances. Lastly, the preposition “for” is a reminder of the contextual 
nature of validation, that is, an intervention can be sufficiently validated for certain uses and 
contexts, but not for others. 
In our present analysis, we take as a working hypothesis the defender’s position that restricts 
the term innovation to interventions that are insufficiently validated for regular healthcare, but 
sufficiently validated as “last chance” interventions. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish 
between regular healthcare and “last chance” contexts. Most notably, literature on regulation of 
innovation (Sugarman 2012, ISSCR 2016, Earl 2019) characterizes innovation as interventions 
with “reasonable chances of success.” Here, they refer to a reasonable level of scientific evidence 
for the use of innovative care for individual patients with few or no acceptable medical 
alternatives. Note that, as Table 3 shows, both standards of reasonable expectations of success for 
regular healthcare and “last chance” interventions set the conceptual upper and lower bounds of 
innovation. Conceptually, as soon as the upper bound is surpassed, an intervention is validated 
practice. In turn, when the lower bound is surpassed, an intervention is futile. To keep our 
definition of innovation as neutral as possible, we will distinguish futility in a narrow sense from 
potentially inappropriate practice as we explain below. 
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Type of practice Level of evidence Exemplary cases 
Validated practice 
• Sufficient level of evidence 
of safety and efficacy for 
regular healthcare. 
• imatinib for CML from early 
2000s to date (Druker 2009). 
 






New non-validated practice 




• Insufficient level of evidence 
of safety and efficacy for 
regular healthcare. 
• Sufficient level of evidence 
of safety and efficacy for 
“last chance” interventions. 
• Successful: The Farrows, the 
Nashes (section 2). 
• Non-Successful: Jim Gass 
(section 2), bone marrow 
transplants for breast cancer 
(ACOG 2015, p. 3).    
Lower bound: reasonable expectation of success for “last chance” interventions 
 
Futile practice 
• Sufficient level of evidence 
of no safety or efficacy for its 
use. 
• Antifungals for myocardial 
infarction; CPR on a dead patient 
(Bosslet et al. 2015, p. 1325) 
Table 3. Evidence-based upper and lower conceptual bounds of innovative practice in medicine  
 
Table 3 only provides a rudimentary outline of possible conceptual upper and lower bounds of 
evidence levels for innovation in cases of “last chance” interventions. This table represents the 
semantic fact that innovation is a relational or comparative concept (London 2006, p. 26), that is, a 
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concept that needs a fixed point or baseline to be meaningful. In this case, the baseline of the 
concept “innovation” is the relevant level of evidence of safety or efficacy of certain use of an 
intervention in a certain real-world context (validation). In what follows, we want to explore this 
characteristic in more depth. We will discuss three substantive basic questions regarding 
‘validation’. To do this, we will present the defenders’ position that at least certain cases of new 
non-validated practice are ethically permissible. Nevertheless, our aim is not to give an original 
justification, but to show that our definition harmonizes with this major view in the literature of 
innovation. 
Our first question is about the appropriate level of evidence for regular healthcare use of 
interventions. Here, we want to explore the upper bound of innovation, that is, “reasonable 
expectation of success” for regular healthcare. Interventions accepted in medical practice may fall 
short of an appropriate scientific validation (Beauchamp and Saghai 2012, p. 49-50). That is, 
although they are regularly use their harm-benefit profile remains underdetermined as to 
whether it provides net clinical benefit or not. However, this informed judgment can vary 
depending on what we consider adequate scientific methods of validation. Beauchamp and Saghai 
(2012) conclude that the commissioners of the Belmont Report never specifically addressed under 
which conditions a medical intervention or a hypothesis is validated. The Commission has been 
aware that there is no universal gold standard of validation. Multi-phase randomized controlled 
trials seek to systematically identify risks and adverse effects and assure that treatments that are 
to be approved are shown to be safe and effective (Rosemann, Bortz, and Vasen 2019). However, 
the scientific community usually accepts that sufficient validation of an intervention is not 
obtained only through the multi-phase trials system (Diaz and Neuhauser 2005).  In fact, from a 
point of view of evidence-based medicine, “RCTs have never monopolized medical knowledge 
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production” (Bothwell et al. 2016). Hence, there seem to be good reasons not to consider 
randomized controlled trials as a universal gold standard, but rather to adopt a case-by-case 
approach applying different research methods and methodologies to appropriate circumstances 
(Cartwright 2007). This latter position does not deny that in many cases, multi-phase randomized 
controlled trials are the appropriate standard of scientific validation. However, even if reasonable 
agents disagree about the appropriate level of evidence for validated practice or the methods of 
validation for the context of regular healthcare, they must agree that, by definition, innovation 
refers to the category of interventions that fail to reach that level (London 2006).  
Our second question concerns the appropriate level of evidence for “last chance” uses of 
interventions in medical practice. In the literature, the term “last chance” refers to interventions 
for patients with serious conditions and unmet health needs. But “last chance” is not a synonym of 
a particular regulatory pathway of accessing innovative practice. Here, we want to examine the 
lower bound of evidence of innovation that we have identified as a reasonable expectation of 
success for “last chance” intervention. Translated into more contemporary research ethics 
language, this refers to an appropriate evidence level regarding the harm-benefit profile of an 
intervention for individuals who lack other reasonable alternatives. From the point of view of 
justification and regulation, this is a substantive issue. As stated by Sugarman (2012), the lack of 
reasonable medical alternatives for an individual goes along with a changed evaluation of the 
harm-benefit profile of an insufficient validated intervention compared to its use in regular 
healthcare. For the defenders, the fact that an individual has no alternative intervention can make 
a “last chance” intervention ex ante a reasonable choice provided certain conditions are met, 
among them scientific validity. As in the case of validated practice for regular healthcare, the 
question about the sound level of evidence for “last chance” interventions remains open. Authors 
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engaged in the “the right to try” debate, argue that for terminally ill patients, it should be the 
successful preliminary prospect of an intervention or, e.g., the successful approval of a phase I 
trial, or in some exceptional cases, just a reasonable scientific rationale and some relevant 
evidence (Dresser 2016, Savulescu 2017). According to the ISSCR guidelines, the assessment of the 
expected success of a stem cell intervention should include any preclinical evidence of safety and 
efficacy (ISCCR, 2016: recommendation 3.4). Furthermore, Sugarman (2016) and the ISSCR 
(2016) guidelines put forward that this should be complemented by a justification of why an 
innovative intervention is used instead of other existing alternatives. Behind this multiplicity of 
epistemic standards and proposed regulations, most defenders of innovation seem to agree that 
all reasonable agents should accept that innovation must be evaluated by informed judgments, 
based on detailed literature knowledge and reasonable peer agreement, about the merits of the 
interventions (London 2016, p. 30).  
Finally, we want to distinguish between futile and potentially inappropriate interventions. 
Following Bosslet et al., an intervention is futile in a narrow sense if it cannot accomplish the 
intended physiological goals, for example, administering antifungals as treatment for an acute 
myocardial infarction or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a patient with signs of 
irreversible death (rigor mortis, dependent lividity) (Bosslet et al. 2015, p. 1325). This narrow 
definition of futility precludes reasonable disagreement, but doctors should still care about 
patients and family perceptions if non-reasonable disagreement remains. This justifies that, in 
general, responsible doctors should not administer futile interventions in this narrow sense for 
ethical reasons of non-maleficence, stewardship of social resources, and integrity (Bosslet et al 
2015, p. 1327). However, there may be room for ethically permissible use of futile intervention in 
very limited situations, such as futile CPR for reasons of care towards the patient’s family or other 
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patients (Truog 2010, Choma et al. 2010). Hence, our use of futile interventions in a narrow sense 
is morally neutral. In turn, an intervention is potentially inappropriate if it has at least some 
chance of accomplishing the effect sought, but competing ethical considerations may justify 
refusing to provide the intervention. For example, it is potentially inappropriate to initiate dialysis 
in a patient in a persistent vegetative state (Bosslet et al. 2015, p. 1324). Competing ethical 
considerations may be summarized in harm for patients or for others (Wilkinson, Petrou, and 
Savulescu 2018). As Bosslet et al. (2015) clarify, whether an intervention is potentially 
inappropriate is not only a technical judgment but a value judgment. Appropriate evidence and 
technical facts are necessary conditions for informed and reasonable judgment, but they have to 
be interpreted in relation to the patients’ best interest, the patients’ (or surrogates) values, and 
society’s rules of fairness. Therefore, reasonable disagreement among the parties is possible and 
should be managed by a “fair process” of conflict resolution that could either favor the doctors’ or 
the patients’ (or surrogates’) perspective.  
If our exemplary cases are true cases of innovation, then their harm-benefit profiles show, by 
definition, an insufficient level of evidence for their regular use in healthcare at a specific time. 
However, even if the harm-benefit profile of an intervention shows insufficient level of evidence 
regarding safety and efficacy for regular use, such interventions may show sufficient level of 
evidence to be used as a “last chance” intervention or not. If responsible innovation is ethically 
permissible as the defenders argue, then new non-validated practice can still be a reasonable 
option in a limited number of cases if they have a sound scientific rationale and meet other 
appropriate conditions. The cases of Matthew Farrow or Molly Nash may meet such rationale. 
Refining the concept of innovation with explicit upper and lower bounds of evidence and 
introducing the category of potentially inappropriate practice allows us to deal with hard cases 
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such as Jim Gass. In table 3, we suggest that, from a morally neutral point of view, the case of Jim 
Gass is neither a futile intervention nor validated practice. From a moral stance, Jim Gass seems as 
a paradigmatic case of potentially inappropriate practice because it did not comply with relevant 
ethical principles for use of innovative care (ISSCR 2016, Holzer & Mastroleo 2019a). 
Unfortunately, we cannot explore the details of the case at this point. However, interpreted as an 
exemplary case of innovation, the case of Jim Gass shows why a good definition of innovation 
should be morally neutral. We want to evaluate the ethical status of cases such as Jim Gass, but we 
first need a definition that captures what it is a case of because different activities have different 
ethical principles as we argue in the next section. In turn, our proposal also harmonizes with the 
literature that counts first or recent uses of unsuccessful interventions such as bed rest, bone 
marrow transplants for breast cancer, and diethylstilbestrol to prevent miscarriages as exemplary 
cases of failed innovation (ACOG 2015, p. 3). Here, we depart from London (2006), who considers 
“improvement” a definitional attribute of “genuine” innovation. Our neutral definition captures all 
responsible or irresponsible and successful or failed cases of new non-validated interventions.  
  
3.3. Intention to Benefit Individual Patients (“Practice”) 
In the last part of our analysis, we state that if the use of new insufficiently validated 
interventions is regarded as innovative practice, then the intention or main aim of such activity 
should be to benefit individual patients. Or in other words, the main aim should be the promotion 
of “patients well-being” (National Commission 1979) or patients’ best interests (Savulescu 2018). 
In traditional research ethics this means that innovation is practice, not research.  
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Here “intention” refers to a goal or aim to which an action is directed, that is, the intention with 
which someone acts (Setiya 2015). Intentional action neither presupposes success in achieving its 
aim, nor always is based on conscious reflective judgments at the time of acting (Scanlon 1998, p. 
23). However, intention presupposes basic capacities of responsible agents, that is, agents that 
have the capacity of planning for the future and the capacity of giving reasons for actions 
according to adequate principles (Scanlon 1998, pp. 21-22). 
The traditional research ethics’ distinction between research and practice is based on two main 
aims, (P2) the promotion of “well-being of patients” and (R2) the contribution or development of 
“generalizable [scientific] knowledge” (National Commission 1979; Levine 1979).7 Hence, practice 
and research are defined as two different intentional activities. In turn, a different intention entails 
different principles for the ethical evaluation and different harm-benefit analysis of those 
activities (Weijer 2000; Bierley and Larcher 2009).8  
We should note that aiming at both patients’ well-being and generalizable scientific knowledge 
is possible in certain circumstances. The priority of one of these aims does not imply the exclusion 
of the other. For instance, in the case of Matthew Farrow, the same intervention promoted the 
well-being of an individual patient and contributed to the generation of scientific knowledge 
(Gluckman et al. 1989). However, hitting two birds with one stone is not always feasible or 
desirable. The development of generalizable scientific knowledge (research), requires 
systematization and planning. In turn, systematization and planning require time, special skills, 
                                                          
7 For our conceptual analysis, we will interpret “design” in the Belmont Report as the intention of an activity (Levine 2004). 
8 For completeness and economy of our conceptual analysis, it is useful to introduce self-interest as a third aim any act from 
a rational responsible agent may have (Taylor 2010). This allows us to formulate undue marketing or commercialization of 
new non-validated practice, a common concern in ethical frameworks, as inappropriate prioritization of self-interest over 
patient well-being and the commitment to contribute to generalizable scientific knowledge (e.g., ACOG 2015; ISSCR 2016, p. 
25). However, to further simplify this analysis, here we will leave out problems of inappropriate self-interest. 
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and exclusive resources on top of whatever resources would be otherwise used for patients’ care. 
Consequently, doing research may also carry an inherent potential for significant delay in 
promoting patients’ well-being (Taylor 2010, p. 290). Even if we characterize innovation as a 
learning activity, it may also entail a potential loss in patients’ clinical benefit (Faden et al. 2013, p. 
s21). For our purpose of defining innovative practice, is enough to show that in some cases 
different uses of interventions may entail prioritization and trade-offs between the well-being of 
patients and the development of scientific knowledge. Our aim in this paper is not assessing the 
ethical justification of this trade-offs, if any, or its regulation. 
In turn, having the intention or main aim to benefit patients does not imply doing it in a 
responsible way. Responsible innovation is using new non-validated practice following certain 
principles. For instance, defenders of innovation consider that moving new non-validated practice 
into sound research should be an essential ethical requirement of responsible innovation. This 
ethical requirement can be seen as a form of bridging the gap between practice (intention to 
benefit patients) and research (intention to contribute to generalizable knowledge). For the 
defenders, innovative practice must remain the exceptional case to avoid undermining public 
trust, exploiting patients’ hope and delaying sound research (ISSCR 2016). This latter obligation is 
described in the literature as the “commitment to contribute to generalizable knowledge” 
(Sugarman 2012; ISSCR 2016) and is also present in the Belmont Report (National Commission 
1979) and the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 1964 [2013]: paragraph 37). However, as the 
literature shows, there are obstacles to support this ethical requirement in real-world situations. 
For instance, lack of research infrastructures in new fields of medicine, lack of specific oversight 
structures for new non-validated practice, prohibition of national research funding in certain 
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clinical areas (e.g. embryo research), etc. (ACOG 2015, pp. 4-5; Rosemann, Bortz, and Vasen 2019; 
Taylor 2010). 
Also, for the defenders of innovation, instrumental rationality sets further limits to the 
responsible use of new non-validated practice. This can be captured by the concept of opportunity 
or “right circumstances” (Taylor 2010). Right circumstances comprise the right timing and proper 
measures, usually judged from the perspective of an expert (Stephenson 2005, p. 1). On the one 
hand, individual patients with unmet health needs and serious conditions have a limited period of 
time or “window of opportunity”, if any, during which some intervention can be expected to 
promote their well-being. On the other hand, new knowledge and technology may entail potential 
uses that fit those unmet health needs, yet be still insufficiently validated for regular use. 
Opportunities for reasonable use of innovative practice, if any, lie in the lucky intersection or right 
timing of both circumstances. The creative response of doctors, but also of informed patients or 
relatives, rests not only in realizing but also anticipating the existence of such opportunities. 
Moreover, one important aspect of the attribute “intention” is its connection to the discussion 
on the justification and regulation of innovation with the adequate harm-benefit analysis. For the 
defenders, interventions considered as innovations in a traditional research ethics’ sense should 
be subject to a harm-benefit profile evaluation according to the standards of medical practice. 
Medical practice is an activity in the best interest of the patient, and not according the best interest 
of research (Levine 1979). For instance, if the new non-validated intervention is the only 
reasonable intervention for unmet health needs of serious conditions, the defenders argue that 
high risks can be reasonably accepted, even outside of sound research. However, if an intervention 
is potentially inappropriate, although its use could otherwise contribute to the benefits of future 
patients or generalizable scientific knowledge, the defenders may argue that responsible doctors 
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should discourage or refuse it. If our conceptual analysis is sound, this shows that novelty or 
insufficient validation of an intervention for regular healthcare use are not enough to determine 
whether something is a new non-validated practice. It is the main intention or overall goal of an 
intervention –to benefit an individual patient or to develop scientific knowledge– which entails 
different thresholds of harm-benefit analysis and ethical evaluation, as shown in traditional 
research ethics and the authors that are based on its intellectual work (e.g., Weijer 2000; Brierley 
and Larcher 2009; ISSCR 2016).  
Finally, to show the importance of the attribute of intention in the definition of new non-
validated practice, we close this section with three exemplary types of new non-validated practice. 
Current regulations allow for these medical practices because their intention is to benefit 
individual patients with no other reasonable options. Hence, these activities are exempted from 
clinical research regulations as such. These cases show that neither levels of risk nor of lack of 
validation are necessary conditions for an intervention to be regarded as research– some arguing 
it ought to be different (Emanuel 2013). 
First, it is the use of an intervention under expanded access (sometimes called “compassionate 
use”), that is, an exceptional use of an intervention outside of sound research aimed to promote 
patients’ well-being for those who do not satisfy eligibility criteria and lack reasonable 
alternatives (Levine 2008, p. 217). For example, expanded access during phase 3 clinical trial of 
imatinib allowed some ineligible patients to access the drug given their urgent medical needs and 
lack of alternatives. It can always be the case that expanded access is riskier than well-designed 
research. Still, as currently practiced, expanded access can be considered as type of new non-
validated practice, and not research (e.g. FDA 2018b). 
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Second, some cases of post-trial access to investigational beneficial interventions, such as 
multiple antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s (Emery and Cooper 1997) or again 
imatinib in the early 2000s (Kolata 2005), serve as examples of the use of new insufficiently 
validated interventions for the benefit of individual patients with no reasonable alternative. Post-
trial access differs from expanded access in the sense that it is restricted only to former 
participants of a research study (MRCT 2017, p. 77; Unguru et al. 2013, p. 4). Post-trial access to 
new non-validated practice may be riskier for different groups of participants.9 However, not 
every case of post-trial access would be a case of new non-validated practice. Post-trial access to 
new non-validated interventions should be called ‘non-validated’ only until an intervention 
becomes new validated, that is, when reaches the level of safety and efficacy for regular healthcare 
use (MRCT 2017, fig. 1). Likewise, most of the research regulations in countries where they are 
available consider that post-trial access to a beneficial intervention is an exceptional medical 
activity with the aim to benefit former participants, not research (MRCT 2017, p. 74-5). 
Third, novel “off-label” uses, that is, first or recent unapproved uses of an approved product by 
a regulatory authority, are also cases of innovation as new non-validated practice, until these uses 
show a sufficient level of validation for regular healthcare. An example is the successful use of 
ustekinumab, a biological product approved for psoriasis, in a 19-year-old patient with an 
immunodeficiency (leukocyte adhesion deficiency type 1 or LAD1) who previously showed a high 
risk of losing all his teeth and an intractable nonhealing wound in his lower back (Moutsopoulos et 
al. 2017; Sugarman 2017). Research regulatory authorities recognize the intention of the activity 
as different from research. Regulatory authorities use formulations such as “when the intent is the 
                                                          
9 Given that an intervention has been shown beneficial for the active arm of a study, it does not necessary follows that the 
very same intervention as post-trial access would be beneficial to the patients of the control group with a more advanced 
stage of disease (see the neuroblastoma case in Unguru et al. 2013). 
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practice of medicine” or “in the best patient interest” to justify such uses in contexts where there 
are no reasonable alternative options (FDA 2018a). 
The above stated examples illustrate that the intention to benefit individual participant is a 
necessary attribute of the definition of innovation in traditional research ethics and our refined 
definition. To give those examples, we have presented the defenders’ view that at least some cases 
of expanded access, post-trial access and novel “off-label” uses are ethically permissible and 
responsible if they comply with certain ethical principles and institutional policies. However, both 
detractors and defenders of innovation may find our proposal useful. It shows our definition of 
innovation as new non-validated practice can unify under one single concept activities that might 
have been considered unconnected. Hence, we believe that our refined definition of innovation is 
important to further discuss the justification and regulation of these and other activities that can 
potentially be identified as new non-validated practice. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed an enhanced definition of innovation as new non-validated practice. 
We argued that this is a better term for referring to the first or recent use of interventions with an 
insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare, and with the main aim to 
benefit individual patients. The objective of the paper has been to develop this definition as well as 
to gain rational acceptance for our proposal. We acknowledge that to forge consensus on a new 
language use in medicine may take time. In the meantime, authors, research authorities, and other 
stakeholders should explain precisely what they mean when using the term innovation and the 
like (Lilford 2018). Our urge to propose a better definition of innovative practice for medicine is 
owed to the real-world consequences it has on patients, science, and public health. Just as the 
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members of the National Commission did, we care about the appropriate use of language because 
it is necessary for the evaluation of responsible action, the prevention of confusion and the 
maintenance and promotion of public health (Confucius 2003, analect 13.3; Levine 1979, p. 25).  
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